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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses public policy choices in the security economy from an economic 
perspective. It discusses the role of public goods for national and global security and 
identifies the importance of the first- and second-order indirect effects of insecurity on 
economic activity, which include the behavioural responses of agents and the government to 
security measures, akin to such effects in insurance economics. Furthermore, key public 
policy trade-offs are outlined, in particular between security and efficiency, globalisation, 
equity and freedom. The analysis identifies suitable policy options for raising security in the 
national and international contexts and in view of these trade-offs. A suitable balance between 
market and non-market instruments in achieving security should be aimed for to minimise the 
adverse effects of aiming for higher security. In addition, the public good nature of security 
implies that international coordination of security policies is important, despite this process 
being itself fraught with enforcement problems. 
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The world seems to have become less secure since September 11, 2001. A variety of risks are 
appearing, are being noticed or are being feared more than before the deadly terror attacks of 
New York and Washington. These risks include the new global terrorism, large scale 
electrical black outs, wars in the Middle East, an increase in computer viruses, worms and 
spam, attacks by snipers, e-commerce fraud, anthrax attacks, petrol strikes, and international 
financial instability. This paper analyses public policy choices in such insecure world. The 
analysis is based on broad definitions of risk (both private and social risks), security (both 
national and global) and security policies (both public and private measures). 
The three objectives of the paper are to apply economic concepts suitable for the analysis of 
public policy choices in the security economy, to identify key policy trade-offs in designing 
security policies, and to discuss suitable policy instruments for attaining security while 
minimising these trade-offs, both nationally and internationally. 
The paper will demonstrate how national and global public goods are involved in providing 
security, how security measures can have strong economic effects themselves (in addition to 
the effects of the insecurity itself), that these effects are composed of both first- and second-
order effects, and that there exist a number of important trade-offs for policy makers in 
deciding what level of security should be attained and which means should be adopted in 
attaining them. These trade-offs include the balancing acts between security and efficiency of 
production and trade, between security and freedom and between security and equity. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines and characterizes the security economy, 
discusses security as national and global public goods, introduces the distinction between 
direct, first-order indirect and second-order indirect effects of security polices, and provides 
an overview over the empirical scale of these indirect effects. Section 3 discusses the trade-
offs between security, on the one hand, and non-security spending, efficiency, globalisation, 
equity and freedom, on the other hand. Section 4 derives policy implications, including in the 
areas of competition, regulation and coordination policies, for both national and international 
policies. Section 5 concludes. 
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This section will first define the security economy before outlining some of the economic 
effects of insecurity itself and some of the effects of the responses to insecurity. This 
distinction is important, as the majority of the costs of insecurity may not stem from the actual 
risks themselves but from people’s and governments’ strong reactions to such risks. 
Characterising the security economy 
“Risk” can have several economic meanings. First, risk describes the possibility of a harmful 
event occurring or being induced. Examples may include the likelihood of a cheque bouncing 
or of a cheque fraudster being detected. Such events may cause substantial damage. Second, 
risk refers to the variation, variance or volatility of economic indicators such as exchange 
rates or future investment returns. These movements may induce costs to some economic 
actors. Third, risk can be defined as an indicator being close to a threshold. Again, there may 
be some cost or loss involved in being close to a threshold. This is akin to the concept of 
vulnerability. The cost of a variation then depends on the distance to a given threshold. 
In this paper, insecurity is defined as an aggregate and unquantifiable form of risk. There are 
different sources of such risks and hence insecurity in the economy. These are related to the 
forces of nature, globalisation, technological, social, and political developments on the one 
hand and economic or market forces on the other hand. These risks differ in their probabilities 
of occurring, the scale of damages they can induce and in the degree of covariance and hence 
insurability, as argued below. 
The security economy will be defined for the purpose of this paper as those activities affected 
by, preventing, dealing with and mitigating insecurity in the economy. Such broad definition 
includes private and public activities in both legal and illegal areas of the economy. Narrower 
versions of this definition (such as a focus on state spending for homeland security or private 
spending for anti-crime devices) may be adopted by other authors for different purposes. 
Security as a public good 
National security, like a lighthouse, is a prototypical public good. National security is non-
rival in consumption; each citizen enjoys the full amount of national security produced, 
without restricting the consumption of other citizens. Furthermore, it is impossible to exclude 
citizens from the provision of national security. Hence, the level of national security provided 
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justification for the public provision or the public regulation of security in a closed economy. 
In the international context, global - rather than national - security is also a public good 
(Sandler 2005). Instances of global insecurity include nuclear wars between the superpowers, 
dramatic climate change induced by greenhouse gas emissions or transnational terrorism. The 
nature of the global public good is that individual countries fail to internalise the foreign costs 
and benefits of their actions and inactions concerning the underlying global risk. 
National defensive measures aimed at diverting the local harmful consequences of global 
risks may be over-supplied from a social planning perspective. For example, increasing 
national precautions against transnational terrorism may reduce such attacks within the 
country but increase the number of attacks against nationals of that country living abroad or 
against other countries. This is what appears to have happened with the pattern of 
transnational terrorist attacks since 9/11, with less protected countries bearing an increasing 
share of transnational terrorist attacks (Sandler 2005). 
National pro-active measures aimed at reducing global risks entail foreign positive 
externalities; pro-active measures are thus under-provided. For example, unilaterally cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions reduces global warming but only has negligible positive effects for 
the pro-active country itself. In the context of transnational terrorism, Sandler (2005) 
identifies the irony that by focussing the attacks of 9/11 against the United States, the US 
government was led to exert additional pressure on other states to intensify their anti-terrorist 
policies. Hence transnational terrorists to some extent are creating conditions which lead to 
their own activities becoming more difficult to implement in the future.
1 As argued by Frey 
and Luechinger (2004), such pro-active policies may also involve positive actions, such as 
bribing terrorists financially or politically to become peaceful. However, such actions will be 
under-provided by national governments with the existence of global threats to security. 
While the existence of national public goods justifies regulation, global public goods provide 
the rationale for internationally coordinating these regulatory schemes. This is especially true 
if the global collective good security is considered to be a weakest-link public good 
                                                 
1 It is not entirely clear from an economic point of view why transnational terrorist should pursue such strategy 
of focussing on their strongest enemy in the first place. 
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rising sea level to flood an island. Each inhabitant can construct a section of the island’s dyke 
as protection from floods. However, the actual protection equals the height of the lowest 
section of the dyke. The same concept holds in principle for the general case of international 
security issues. Even if country A spent a lot on security s (that is it achieves a high sA*) it 
may be negatively affected by another country B with a lower sB*. Through international air 
transport, country B may export insecurity unwittingly, for example by transporting suitcases 
with bombs enclosed onboard a plane travelling towards country A - as happened in the 
Lockerbie bombing. The weakest-link nature of many security-related collective good 
problems strongly shapes the policy recommendations discussed in section 4. 
Direct economic effects of insecurity 
Insecurity imposes costs on people who are risk averse. Standard economic theory 
demonstrates that economic agents, if they bare risk-averse, would prefer a world of less 
insecurity and are willing to pay a premium to reduce risks. Yet the costs of insecurity are 
composed of three effects. First, the direct costs resulting from the underlying risky event 
itself. Second, the indirect first-order costs induced by the agent’s reaction to the threat. And 
finally, the indirect second-order costs that are caused by the policy responses to the event and 
to the agents’ reactions. 
Direct effects of insecurity include losses in property rights, output, utility, health or lives 
resulting from events such as theft, fraud, computer viruses, power cuts or terrorism. The 
first-order negative effects contain the responses by the directly affected parties, such as 
precautionary information technology measures taken by a company targeted by computer 
viruses. The second-order indirect effects include the costs of the measures implemented by 
government in response to actual or perceived risks. These may include economic policies or 
more general political reactions to insecurity. 
A recent empirical study by Siems and Chen (2004) investigating the response of capital 
markets to cataclysmic events concludes that the indirect effects of insecurity may well 
outweigh the direct effects in terms of economic relevance. The authors also find that 
American capital markets have improved their response times to various cataclysmic events in 
the last fifty years. It appears that earlier events had not been more dramatic than recent 
events. Instead, the economy had not been able to deal with crises in an adequate way in 
earlier years. The authors explain this inter alia with improvements in the efficiency of the 
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stability. In addition, fast and well-coordinated responses by the monetary authorities helped 
stabilise the American financial system. The study emphasises that it is not only the nature 
and the direct effects of a disastrous incident that determines its consequences but also the 
reactions by agents and policy makers, that is the indirect effects. 
First-order indirect effects: agent’s reaction 
One important first-order indirect effect of insecurity is a rise in private sector security 
spending. Such spending may express an underlying desire to protect production or to 
enhance a firm’s products. As such, security spending may be voluntary or in response to 
market forces. Security spending could also be obligatory as a result of new security 
legislation. This distinction has an impact on the competitiveness of firms. 
In the first case, firms decide to spend money on security in the short term to minimise long-
term costs (for example by spending on building security to avoid or deter fire, thieves or 
terrorists attacks). Such spending is akin to insurance spending and reflects a firm’s 
information, perception and preferences. Firms can be said to self-insure against certain risks. 
It is likely that some firms have higher costs than others, for instance as a result of their 
location in high-risk zones. 
In the second case, firms respond to market forces for enhanced security measures, for 
example because employees require employers to have such security measures (for example 
protecting ex-pat staff on high-risk postings) or because more security has to be embedded 
into a firm’s products (for example alarm systems in cars). In these cases, costs rise but 
potentially revenues rise as well or are prevented from falling. Such measures may involve 
many firms in a market although some firms may opt to provide lower security and hence 
lower quality products thus occupying a different niche of the market. An intermediate level 
of cost differentiation may thus obtain. 
In the third case, firms are legally obliged to implement certain security measures (for 
instance foreign airlines serving the US). In this case, the extra security spending acts akin to 
an environmental regulation aimed at increasing social welfare. Such regulation typically 
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2 Within-sector productivity will fall as a result 
of such enforced spending. In parallel, new sectors may emerge to service the new security 
needs as can be observed in the environmental service sector. For a closed economy, this then 
implies that costs are borne uniformly by all firms in a given sector. Internationally, this may 
not hold and raises important trade policy issues. 
This third case also contrasts with a new tax imposed on a sector. Taxes also reduce 
productivity and may affect certain firms uniformly. However, taxes have the important 
implication of raising tax revenue, which can then be used to achieve some other social good 
or to compensate some other actor. Also, in the case of taxation, the taxable sector and the 
sector at risk may differ while in the case of state security spending the two are necessarily 
the same. Hence in the latter case, threatened sectors may be doubly affected by the new 
insecurity, both through the security risk and the security legalisation. Depending on the 
circumstances, this suggests the policy recommendation to diverge security measures and 
their financing to reduce the burden of new security measures. 
Indirect first-order effects concerning the behaviour of agents in response to the existence of 
risky events can also be analysed using standard insurance theory. Insurance can be used by 
risk-averse agents to overcome the negative effects of risk. By a large set of such agents 
forming an insurance, they can spread risks and thus improve welfare. Even if the nature of 
the risk allows such pooling, moral hazard and adverse selection may affect the insurance 
market. 
In the case of moral hazard, insured agents take higher risks than non-insured agents. For 
example, the existence of an obligatory terror re-insurance (or even re-re-insurance) may 
encourage insurers (or re-insurers) to accept more risky customers. This implies that 
insurance (or risk-sharing mechanisms such as regulation more generally) can actually 
increase risk levels compared to the absence of insurance (or regulation). 
In the case of adverse selection, high risk agents take up insurance but insurance companies 
cannot identify the nature of these individuals due to asymmetric information. For example, 
the recipients of credible terror threats are more likely to buy terror insurance thus leaving the 
insurance company with a risky and potentially uninsurable pool of clients. This implies that 
                                                 
2 The distributional long-term effects of such regulation will be addressed in section 3. 
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asymmetric information is very prevalent. 
Furthermore, the insurance market is affected by first-order indirect effects on the supply side 
(Kunreuther et al. 2003). Standard war or terror risks cannot be insured at prices which are 
acceptable to customers as their occurrence is too strongly correlated across contracts for 
insurance companies to be able to pool its risks effectively. 
In order to illustrate how severely the economy can be influenced by first-order indirect 
effects of insecurity, it is useful to consider some possible instances of such reactions. Greater 
insecurity (for example due to terrorist attacks) may lead to the re-design of supply chains 
which in turn reduces the benefits from just-in-time production processes. Alternatively, firms 
may prefer to source their inputs from local suppliers if these are less affected by certain 
insecurities. Such local suppliers may be more reliable but also more expensive. In the long 
term, such cost pressures may induce a variety of changes, such as increases in inventories, 
investments in new technologies or changes in the balance of horizontal or vertical integration 
(Sheffi 2001, Hodges and McFarlane 2003). 
Other indirect effects of higher insecurity include higher transaction costs of conducting 
business, including higher transport costs and higher transport insurance rates (Lenain et al. 
2002). This will reduce trade flows, the transport and tourism sectors, both domestically and 
internationally (Nitsch and Schumacher 2004, Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002). The decline in 
trade could reduce the spread of economic activity and boost geographic clustering. But the 
more clustered an economy is, the more valuable the clustered target is for terrorists, for 
instance, thus further raising insecurity (Frey and Luechinger 2004). 
In fact, large scale violence impact cities in three ways. First, the safe-harbour-effect 
encourages people to concentrate to have an advantage in defending themselves from 
attackers, making cities more appealing in times of rising violence. Second, the target-effect 
implies that cities are more attractive targets for violence, which creates an incentive to 
disperse. Third, the transportation-effect suggests that as terrorism often targets means of 
transportation, violence can increase the effective cost of transportation, which will usually 
increases the demand for density. However, empirical evidence on war and cities in the 20th 
century suggests that the effect of wars or terrorism on urbanity are not significant. Having 
said that, there are notable exceptions in some extreme instances (Glaeser and Shapiro 2001). 
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openness. For example, less online trade may be conducted in the presence of online fraud 
and less international outsourcing may be undertaken in the presence of regular riots, 
roadblocks or strikes abroad. Change in relative prices as a result of insecurity will lead to a 
suboptimal re-allocation of resources. Therefore, the insecure economy will have lower GDP 
growth than would obtain otherwise (Lenain et al. 2002). 
Higher levels of risk also undermine investor confidence, reducing their willingness to 
commit to new projects. Over time, higher risk premiums increase required rates of returns on 
investments, reducing equity prices and biasing investment decisions against high-risk, high-
return, long-term investments towards low-risk, low-return, short-term investments. The 
cumulative effect of such portfolio adjustments is to change the composition of portfolio, to 
reduce overall investment and to retard further economic growth. However, markets will also 
induce positive feedback effects causing structural shifts. These will occur in favour of 
products and services which have embedded security as an important characteristic. 
It is worth noting that reactions to insecurity may not always be justified, even if they are 
voluntary, because the degree of insecurity is also a matter of perception. Actual risks are 
extremely hard to assess. There is strong evidence that people, and by extension policy 
makers, are poor judges of objective levels of risks. On the one hand, especially when strong 
emotions such as fear are involved, people tend to focus on the worst-case scenarios rather 
than on the probability of the outcome occurring. As a result agents over-estimate minor risks 
or neglect significant risks (Sunstein 2003). In addition, the public representation of insecurity 
is very skewed (Kunreuther 2002). Airline crashes, for example, receive more column inches 
in newspapers than fatal car accidents, although the former cause fewer casualties than the 
latter. For both reasons it is likely that the private sector and policy makers over-provide 
security measures and legislation, so that the costs of security may easily exceed its benefits. 
On the other hand, Kunreuther and Heal (2003) point out that, on the demand side, people 
tend to under-estimate the risks of natural disasters or terrorist attacks when it comes to 
making insurance decisions. This “it-will-not-happen-in-my-backyard” mentality represents 
another obstacle for developing an insurance market for disastrous events. 
Finally, the events of 9/11 may have revealed to the general public which state of insecurity 
they actually face. This view is supported by evidence that the likelihood of terrorist attacks 
has not increased after 9/11 but that agents assess this risk more realistically (Sandler 2003). 
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increasing the share of security-related spending or reductions in demand for airline travel) 
may not be inefficient but rather are the result of an adjustment process towards a new market 
equilibrium. 
Second-order indirect effects: policy reaction 
Government regulation can cause insecurity in two ways. First, there may be an element of 
regulatory insecurity where an increasing density of regulation, though aimed at raising social 
welfare, increases uncertainty for firms operating in an environment of raising legal 
obligations. Second, certain types of regulation may trigger illegal responses raising 
insecurity. For example, the period of prohibition in the United States from 1920 to 1933 
represents an instance where a policy reaction induced a significant but perverse behavioural 
response, including illegal brewing, smuggling and organised crime. 
The degree of government security regulation is quite large in many economic sectors. For 
example, inspections and other security regulations create delays at borders, increase shipping 
times and reduce border permeability thus reducing trade flows. Such regulation thus 
enhances the direct effects of insecurity on trade. In addition, standard government 
regulations in the fields of national defence, fighting crime and civil rights will impose further 
costs on businesses (Hobijn 2002, Philips 2001, Lenain et al. 2002, World Bank 2003). 
Security regulations imply shifting economic resources between actors, including between 
sellers and buyers and between private and public agents. The existence of such a burden will 
reduce the efficiency of the market and hence growth. 
In the insurance market, second-order indirect effects exist as well. For example, the market 
for terror re-re-insurance has been organised quite differently in various OECD economies 
(Kunreuther et al. 2003, Wolgast and Ruprecht 2003). While in the United States the 
government required insurance firms to offer terror insurance, in Germany for instance the 
government helped subsidise a monopolist public-private partnership re-re-insurer to cover 
potential terror risks. The US scheme has suffered from insurance firms offering the 
obligatory terror insurance but doing so at premiums that are unattractive to most firms. Thus 
the insurers fulfil their legal obligations without incurring risky and potentially unprofitable 
terror risks. Therefore, this may represent an instance where public intervention and even 
subsidies are necessary for maintaining some market forces, rather than using regulation (or 
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for terror insurance. 
Another second-order indirect effect of insecurity is the increase in public security spending 
which may have a retarding impact on long-term growth through two channels: First, high 
budgets for defence and homeland security may crowd out more growth-enhancing 
investments. Second, there is some evidence that public security spending may also crowd out 
the more efficient private sector attempts to increase security. These point will be addressed 
in more detail in section 3. 
Estimates of the scale of indirect effects 
Empirically, it is difficult to directly measure the costs of the indirect effects. The following 
paragraphs will therefore provide an overview over existing estimates of instances of such 
costs for the cases of security spending and non-fiscal security measures (such as tighter 
border controls). 
In assessing the economic effects of security spending, Hobijn (2003) claims that neither 
private nor public spending on security will have a major impact on the economy. Private 
security spending in the United States in his view will reduce labour productivity by 1.12 % 
and multifactor productivity by 0.65 %, which in turn results in only small reductions of 
American GDP. In addition, he predicts that security-related research and development 
(R&D) will not significantly crowd out productivity enhancing R&D. In regard to public 
security spending, he calculates that homeland security spending will reduce output only by 
0.6 % over a five-year period. Judging by the much larger scale of military spending in the 
1980s, he believes that to be negligible and to have no effect on the US budget deficit. 
However, one should interpret Hobijn’s optimistic results with a degree of caution. The 
analysis contains some important assumptions such that private expenditures for security will 
only double in the future. Hobijn may also under-estimate the future public spending by the 
Bush administration, especially when adding homeland and national security spending in the 
light of the Iraq war and occupation. 
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depend too strongly on governmental estimates of future security budgets.
3 Nordhaus finds 
that the costs of wars, for example, are always grossly under-estimated, which is perfectly 
rational from the point of view of the warring government. 
Another analysis partly backing Hobijn’s view is a simulation of the combined growth effects 
of increased private expenditures for security (up 0.5 % of GDP) and increased military 
spending (up 1 % of GDP) financed through borrowing (Lenain et al. 2002). This study 
suggests that real GDP would be reduced by about 0.7 % after five years. The effect is small 
but permanent and derives from the consequences of undermining fiscal consolidation. The 
post-cold war peace dividend is not threatened by such an increase in security-related 
spending. 
Moving from the effects of security spending to the effects of security measures, it has been 
estimated that a one-day delay at the border controls costs 0.5% of the value of the delayed 
good (Hummels 2001). Another calculation suggests rising trading costs of 1 % to 3 % ad 
valorem after September 11 (Leonard 2001). Based on such values, it has been estimated that 
an increase in US inventories of 10 % and an increase in US commercial insurance premiums 
of 20 % would cost 0.1 % and 0.3 % of GDP per year, respectively (Raby 2003). Another 
study calculates an elasticity of trade flows (in volume terms) with respect to transport costs 
(ad valorem) to be lying in the range of –2 to –3.5 (Limao and Venables 2001). 
In international trade, the total global welfare losses resulting from such security-related 
increases in transaction costs after 9/11 have been estimated using a computable general 
equilibrium model to be relatively low with about 75 billion USD per year (Walkenhorst and 
Dihel 2002). Yet that study also suggests that some regions and sectors are hit particularly 
hard, as goods with a low ratio of value to weight (such as agricultural products, textiles, non 
metallic minerals and machinery) are vulnerable to an increase in transaction costs. The 
regions most affected by 9/11 in absolute terms according to Walkenhorst and Dihel are 
Western Europe, North America and Northern Asia. However, they calculate that Southern 
Asia, North Africa and the Middle East suffer the most damage in relation to the size of their 
                                                 
3 Security budgets may even be poorly measured ex post, as argued by Brauer (2004) for the case of the United 
States. 
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countries may be particularly affected by the first- and second-order effects of 9/11. 
A different methodological approach involves directly estimating the effect of the existence of 
insecurity on growth or international trade. One such study finds that international trade flows 
are significantly reduced by the existence of terrorism in a trading partner’s country (Nitsch 
and Schumacher 2004). In the short-term, this effect is estimated to reduce international trade 
by 4 % if the number of terrorist incidents in one country is doubled. 
It is open to empirical analysis if and how soon the negative effects of insecurity will wear off 
in the long-term. Increases in efficiency may be obtained by better regulation and 
implementation (Sheffi 2001, Hobijn 2003, Lenain et al. 2002, Walkenhorst and Dihel 2002, 
Raby 2003, World Bank 2003). Regulation may be more targeted, thus reducing unnecessary 
security measures. Markets may respond to existing security measures, finding new ways to 
communicate, to produce and to deliver goods. Security measures may deter or identify 
criminals thus reducing the exposure to risks and hence making the measures superfluous in 
the long-term. This may be true. It is, however, not clear if these developments will actually 
occur. A key policy focus should thus be the monitoring of security spending, the security 
situation, the security policies and their effects on the economy to adjust measures over time 
as appropriate. 
Overall, security spending and security measures do have strong effects. It is less clear that 
these effects significantly restrict growth, trade and other economic activities. However, 
security policies appear to have a differential impact, depending on the nature of the 
economy. In the long-term, there operate strong forces which will alleviate the negative 
economic effects of security policies. 
3. ECONOMIC TRADE-OFFS 
Policy makers must assess the benefits and the costs of introducing security measures. This 
section will consider the trade-offs that are involved in providing security, especially in regard 
to efficiency, equity and liberty. 
Security spending versus other spending 
The first trade-off refers to the different types of expenditure by both the private sector and 
governments. Such butter versus guns decisions include the trade-offs between different types 
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services. 
The character of public spending on military services is mainly consumptive, with only a 
small part of military budgets being devoted to R&D (Ram 1995). An economic benefit of 
military spending is the prevalence of peace. Yet this effect is difficult to estimate in practice. 
In addition, demand effects will increase GDP growth in the short term while in the long term 
negative effects may prevail: A large defence budget crowds out public investments, thus 
lowering total factor productivity. Military spending may also increase the budget deficit, the 
national debt and hence interest rates. Cutting military budgets (or realising a peace dividend) 
may thus boost growth through higher capital accumulation, a higher civilian labour force and 
more productive capital allocation for a given security threat. 
A similar line of reasoning also holds for the case of private spending on security. Since 
output is not positively affected by this spending (especially when spending concerns hiring 
more guard labour) productivity falls. In addition productive investments are likely to be 
crowded out and hence growth is retarded. Therefore both public and private spending on 
security may have both expansionary and dampening effects on growth, with the net effect 
being ambiguous a priori and empirically (Lenain et al. 2002). 
Security versus efficiency 
The second trade-off concerns efficiency. An economy is efficient when it maximises 
production from a given set of resources and technologies. Aiming for security entails both 
costs and benefits. Such costs may cause frictions in production thus preventing the economy 
from functioning efficiently. 
This could refer to the equilibrium position on the production possibility frontier (PPF) where 
the marginal rate of substitution between the good security and the alternative good equals the 
price ratio between these two goods. If an exogenous shock requires a higher provision of 
security then this may lead to a reallocation of production from the alternative good to the 
production of security. The new equilibrium may be efficient if at that point the price ratio 
also equals the marginal rate of substitution between these two goods. An inefficient level of 
security production would only obtain if production of either or both goods was within the 
PPF or if the marginal rate of substitution did note equal the price ratio, that is if frictions 
exist which prevented achieving the new equilibrium. 
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to technological change, which could potentially extend the PPF outwards. The nature of the 
security markets, of the new technological developments and of government regulation then 
determines if efficiency obtains. Government policy should thus be geared towards 
maintaining markets and incentives which make this feasible. 
Efficiency can be visualised as minimal levels of transaction costs, for example when crossing 
borders or generally in trade. Here there appears to be an obvious trade-off between security 
and efficiency as more border controls increase security but also reduce the speed and ease 
with which goods and people are moved. In the long run, however, this trade-off may 
disappear, as argued above. Security driven improvements may even facilitate trade in the 
long run. Additional investments in secure facilities and modern technologies can reduce 
transaction costs. Security cost pressures could potentially induce reforms in trade-related 
institutions and infrastructure with beneficial effects on trade and growth. Better trade 
facilitation due to deregulation of trade-related sectors, harmonisation of customs services and 
coordination across countries would increase trade among 75 countries by 377 billion USD 
(World Bank 2003). 
Another example concerns the public versus the private provision or regulation of security 
services and rules. For instance, the United States increased the public sector employment of 
airport security personnel post-9/11 (Phillips 2001). It is not clear ex ante if such services 
must necessarily be provided by the federal or state government or if, with suitable regulation, 
private firms may not have provided security more efficiently. 
Security versus globalisation and technological change 
The third trade-off may occur between security on the one hand and globalisation and 
technological change on the other hand. It is not clear ex ante whether globalisation is 
compounding or extenuating the problems associated with the security economy.
4 
                                                 
4 One example of the former effect is that transnational terrorism, itself made possible by globalisation, also 
implies that terrorists have to hit increasingly large targets to make an impact on global current affairs (Sandler 
2005). In other words, there exists a race for nastiness among transnational terrorists. 
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the same forces which can bring some countries and sectors such prosperity are highly 
vulnerable to security threats. It is both the openness and the interdependence that enable 
various risks to destabilise the international economy (Stevens 2003). On the other hand, 
coordination, integration and harmonisation associated with globalisation reduce the scope for 
insecurity and make the tracking of the sources of insecurity easier. 
In addition, globalisation is a process which provides on-going flows of benefits while many 
forms of insecurity cause one-off, shock-like costs (unlike the fight against insecurity which 
may cause ongoing costs, too). In an integrated, globalised world economy, building 
coalitions to fight insecurity by providing public goods may hence be much easier than in a 
world economy dominated by import-substituting nation states. 
Accordingly, Siems and Chen conclude that the globalised world has become more stable in 
face of threats (2004). Especially the policy response to 9/11 showed how effectively 
cooperation can be indeed conducted. The international integration made it both necessary 
and possible for authorities all over the world to share relevant information and to reconcile 
policies in order to absorb such tremendous shock. 
Globalisation and technological change induce structural change in open economies. 
Especially the security economy may witness an accelerated structural change (Sheffi 2001, 
World Bank 2003). This may be obtained through technological advances induced by 
investments in security infrastructure, for example through the automation, surveillance and 
informational exchange in harbours, airports and border crossings. Globalisation may thus 
serve as the very means that makes the trade-off between security and efficiency diminish in 
the long run. 
One important policy challenge is the integration of technical security protocols into 
international organisations, agreements and technical standards (such as the European Union, 
the World Trade Organisation and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)). 
Transparency and harmonisation should be sought to reduce transaction costs. In addition, 
security concerns should not permit the establishment of non-tariff trade barriers. Another 
policy implication addresses the role of economic winners and losers from structural change 
induced by new security regulations. This will be discussed further below. 
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unable to reap the benefits of globalisation if their territory is not seen to be safe or reputable 
any more (for example by not guaranteeing security, providing smart technologies and 
protecting supply chains). Those economies will face higher risk premiums and the cost of 
protecting assets will rise, reducing foreign direct investments. 
Competition concerning both the supply of security between countries and the nature of the 
provision of security within countries could evolve. Some countries may specialise in 
utilizing their comparative advantage in producing secure or insecure goods (such as the 
respective examples of the United States and Taliban-led Afghanistan in the case of terrorism 
or Switzerland and some small island states in the case of more or less prudent banking 
facilities). 
In addition, countries may choose different models of providing a given standard of security 
within an international organisation. NATO, for example, has contained in its history both 
democracies and dictatorships as well as armies of recruits and professional armies. For 
companies, there is geographic choice in their production decisions, both in regard to the 
desired level of security and the nature in which this level is achieved. As a result each 
country A would than obtain its (individually) optimal level of security sA*, a circumstance 
which may well conflict with the weakest-link nature of international security. 
Security versus equity 
A politically and socially sensitive trade-off concerns the distributional costs of increased 
security. Analytically, it is not clear ex ante which groups should gain or loose most from 
higher security. Many security services are provided by the low skilled (such as guards) but 
many technology-intensive products will be developed by the highly skilled. If international 
trade is reduced by higher security-related transaction costs, then this may damage 
employment in those sectors or countries most affected by such measures. Public sector 
employment may rise if public security spending focuses on judicial, police, customs and 
military personnel. However, some of their services can also be subcontracted to private 
providers, which is an important policy option when considering the efficient provision of 
security. 
Governments could consider compensating the losers of security measures within their 
countries. Internationally, this may be particularly important if losers of the security economy 
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themselves be the source of future insecurity. Hence the compensation of losers (and perhaps 
the taxation of the winners) is strongly related to the causes and the nature of the insecurity. 
One option may be the accelerated and unilateral reduction of trade barriers for developing 
countries particularly damaged by the war against terrorism. 
Another equity issue is related to the access to security services and products. Lower income 
groups may, as a result of market forces or due to administrative processes, be excluded from 
secure products or services. One can also think of social clustering since the poor may only be 
able to afford property in less safe environments or regions. Policy makers may wish to 
consider how they can grant egalitarian access to the security economy. 
Another equity concern has already been mentioned in section 2. While it is clear that both 
market-induced and compulsory investments in security measures raise costs for firms, it is 
less clear ex ante whether the producer or the consumer bear a larger share of the costs. Using 
tax-incidence analysis, one can demonstrate that the short-term burden is distributed 
according to the price elasticities of demand and supply. In the long-term, however, the 
supply elasticity is apt to be perfectly elastic in a globalised world, thus allowing most of the 
costs to be shifted onto the consumers. 
Security versus freedom and privacy 
The fifth trade-off concerns the balance of civil rights, privacy and individual freedom versus 
the possible need to curtail these rights in the pursuit of more security. Internet, computing, 
mobile and wireless technologies are highly vulnerable to security attacks. At the same time, 
these technologies can be used to monitor movements, usage and profiles of individuals or 
goods – by consumers, regulators and potential perpetrators of crimes. For example, a positive 
correlation between democracy and the levels of terrorist activities has been observed in 
various studies (Sandler 2005). This effect may result from terrorists preferring to act in 
countries where their attacks will be reported widely.
5 
                                                 
5 Such negative consequence of press freedom may only be overcome if freedom of press (or democracy) was a 
truly universal phenomenon. 
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exclusively the domain of economic analysis. First, there is a clear trade-off between 
economic freedom and economic growth, at least in the extreme. The empirical estimation of 
this trade-off may lead to ambiguous results but analytically it should be clear that a high 
level of regulation and restriction hampers productivity growth and utility maximisation 
(Paldam and Würtz 2003). 
Second, the evolution of the network economy and the evolution of the security economy are 
closely related. The opportunity to process and link data of low marginal value is growing 
dramatically. With it rises both the vulnerability of interconnected and interdependent data 
systems and the opportunities for tracing criminals. Protecting these systems, using their 
opportunities and maintaining civil liberties requires a fine balancing act. The greater demand 
for security-induced surveillance and the technological advances in this field facilitate the 
potential abuse of data mining, social sorting and losses in privacy (Lyon 2003). 
In fact, many economic sectors require increasingly complex information chains in 
production. The monitoring of the origins of food, of industrial chemicals (especially in the 
European Union), and of dangerous waste products increasingly require source-to-use chains 
of information. The use of smart tags can thus be expected to rise dramatically as will the use 
of positioning- and navigation-systems in combination with mobile technologies (Hodges and 
McFarlane 2003). These technological and legal developments demonstrate the rising 
challenges for the security economy and its policy makers. Resolving civil rights and 
technological security issues should occur in parallel to the implementation of such 
information chains. Forcing the resolution of security concerns may actually accelerate the 
development of source-to-use information systems. 
In addition, social preferences about the relative value of judicial type I and type II errors may 
evolve in the security economy. This may be particularly true for very rare but extreme events 
where the importance of balancing type I errors (where the innocent goes to jail) and type II 
errors (where the guilty walks free) may be reversed (Kunreuther 2002). Many societies, 
when protecting their own citizens from extreme attack, prefer to punish the innocent than to 
let the guilty escape with committing atrocities. The opportunity cost of inaction weighs 
particularly heavily in the security economy. This may hence lead to an otherwise excessive 
level of security regulation and spending. However, there is no obvious, technocratic 
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have to decide what their preferences are in this respect. 
4. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Having reviewed the nature of the security economy, the direct and indirect effects of 
insecurity, and the trade-offs involved in reaching more security, this section will discuss 
options for designing security policies in the national and international contexts. 
National policy instruments 
Policies aimed at reducing our exposure to risks can be defensive (for example by installing 
anti-virus software) or pro-active (for example by identifying, arresting and punishing hackers 
before, as or after they strike). Some of the defensive policies may not be security policies in 
a narrow sense. Yet it is a useful to remember that reducing economic insecurity involves 
many more policy fields than law-and-order or economic policies. 
In addition to defensive and pro-active policies, other policies may aim to reduce the costs of 
insecurity. This may serve the purpose of reducing the impact of insecurity but also of making 
deliberate acts of insecurity less attractive to the perpetrators. Frey and Luechinger (2004), for 
example, suggest that raising the marginal costs of terrorists to undertake terrorist attacks by 
adopting deterrence policies may not be the best response to such threats. Instead, terrorism 
may be fended off more effectively by abating the expected benefits of terrorist acts for the 
prospective terrorists. Such a policy could be based on strengthening decentralized decision-
making since a strike against authority would then have only little effects on the stability of 
the polity and the economy. 
The analysis of security policies should also differentiate between different policy 
instruments. Information and institutions are one group of policies to achieve deterrence and 
punishment. Since the probability of malevolence tends to be over-estimated by individuals, 
information should be used to make risks more transparent. One set of policy instruments 
includes regulation, supervision and coordination while another involves the provision of 
financial incentives and disincentives, for example through fiscal policy. For instance, in 
addition to the under-provision of security, a market economy may also under-invest in 
security-related R&D. As R&D generates spillovers for society, the social rate of return is 
typically higher than the private rate, and hence private investment in R&D typically falls 
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be a case for state subsidies for security-related R&D. 
The public debate about the fight of terrorism since 9/11, for instance, has focussed quite 
strongly on security spending and the adjustment of civil rights while neglecting some other 
instruments, such as international coordination, political signals or even, at times, deliberate 
des-interest. Most importantly, the public debate often failed to ask how market forces may 
help solve some of the problems that society faces, instead focussing strongly on government 
intervention, regulation and spending. 
Even if government regulation of the security economy is necessary, it should be tailored with 
care. Incentives, expectations and market powers should be emphasised to raise the efficiency 
of the intervention. Crowding out should be avoided to reduce the negative secondary effects 
of intervention (especially on growth). As noted above, regulation that “adds insult to injury” 
by placing the incidence of regulation on those already suffering the direct effects of 
insecurity may be economically unproductive and socially unfair. The post-9/11 insurance 
sector serves as an example of how public-private cooperation may be feasible in more cases 
than previously envisaged, for example in providing security services or in implementing new 
regulatory schemes for re-re-insuring terror (Lenain et al. 2002, Wolgast and Ruprecht 2003). 
Market forces also provide mechanisms to enhance voluntary security spending. For example, 
agents investing in security may pay lower insurance premiums or low risk individuals may 
accept higher deductibles in insurance contracts as a way of signalling their status and 
avoiding moral hazard and adverse selection. Such outcomes can be enhanced further by 
regulation defining liability, which increases the incentives of the guilty party to act 
responsible. However, even market forces may not be able to overcome moral hazard and 
adverse selection entirely, thus implying that insurance markets cannot be relied on to 
diversify all possible risks through market forces alone. 
International policy coordination 
As argued above, dealing with global public goods requires international coordination. There 
are many incidents in the global security economy where uncooperative behaviour falls short 
of the socially optimal outcome. The aforementioned under-supply of pro-active policies and 
the over-supply of defensive measures may serve as examples. In the first case, nations are 
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resembles the well-known tragedy of the commons (Sandler 2005). 
It is the weakest-link public good nature that emphasises the need for international 
cooperation and intervention. Whenever the overall level of protection is set by the least 
contributor, competition fails to achieve the efficient level of security both in the private and 
the public spheres. 
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) give an example from the private sector by noting that airline A 
will only install an additional baggage screening system at its check-in counters if other 
airlines (including airline B) adopt similar systems. This is because the hazard may not only 
arise from passengers who check in directly with airline A, but also from passengers who 
check in bags with airline B and then arrange for their luggage to be transferred, with 
necessarily being checked again by airline A. The security of airline A is hence determined by 
the weakest link in the chain of airlines. The decision by all airlines to remain unprotected is 
then a Nash equilibrium of a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Only a coordinated approach can break this suboptimal equilibrium by guaranteeing the 
participation of every airline. International organisations like the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) can stipulate rules and regulations for their members. A key policy issue 
are the sanctions that are implemented locally within member states, which apply in the case 
of national deviant behaviour. 
A public-sector example is provided by Sandler (2005). He makes the point that even a nation 
which heavily invests in securing its domestic targets is still vulnerable as it is linked with 
other less secure countries through trade, travel and migration. It is again the weakest-link 
character of other countries that cannot (or choose not to) increase domestic and border 
security which causes the problem This shortcoming must be overcome by international 
institutions such as the OECD, NATO, the UN, and ISO by setting minimum standards in the 
areas of defence, politics and economics. 
However, this coordinating task is challenging. International cooperation tends to be myopic 
due to political (in particular democratic electoral) processes and due to a preference by 
governments to be autonomous in defence matters. This contrasts with the long-term planning 
horizons of terrorists (who rarely have credible outside options). 
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the capacity to conform to international standards. As a consequence, the international 
community must support these states through either cash transfers or in-kind transfers, which 
itself poses a collective action problem. Governments face a standard free-rider situation 
where every government “sits on its hands” expecting others to provide the transfers. 
Furthermore, there is a moral-hazard problem associated with cash-transfers, since the 
recipient may divert the money for concerns other than enhancing its security (Sandler 2005). 
Despite these obstacles, international security policies should also contain a strong 
commitment to international development as one of the pillars of global security policy. This 
view corresponds to the so-called “Solana strategy”, the European security strategy proposed 
by the European Commission (2003). In addition, compensatory or complementary 
liberalising policies are important to provide a strong stimulus of world economic growth and 
to generate the economic surplus to assist vulnerable groups in the global security economy. 
This applies especially in the area of transport costs and world trade, where additional trade 
access could be provided to countries at risk from loosing out in the security economy 
(Leibfritz 2003, World Bank 2003). 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The paper finds that in addition to its striking direct effects, insecurity can have important 
indirect effects via agents’ behavioural and governments’ policy responses. Policy insecurity, 
the burden and incidence of security regulation, and unintended responses to policies may 
raise aggregate insecurity further. The emergence of new risks induces structural changes in 
the economy, both across sectors and across countries. Markets may be inhibited due to 
insecurity but insightful regulation can also help support the emergence of markets otherwise 
threatened by the nature of the risks.  
These issues drive the complex trade-offs which policy makers face in the security economy. 
For instance, the trade-off between butter and guns does not imply a simple choice between 
more or less growth, respectively. Likewise, security-related transaction costs may rise in the 
short-term but may fall even previous levels in the long-term. There is hence a potential for 
the emergence of “secure growth”, akin to the emergence of “green growth”. 
Policy instruments in the security economy have to account for the complexity of these issues 
and should therefore not be overtly dependent on regulation alone. Instead market 
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costs of remaining risks. Non-markets instruments may be useful for regulating access to the 
security economy and for coordinating technical standards suitable for the security economy. 
However, state intervention should not be sued to stem necessary structural changes with an 
economy. Very importantly, a social dialogues is necessary, and will emerge, on the relative 
merits of civil liberties and extreme forms of insecurity. 
Concerning domestic policy interventions in the security economy, governments should 
refrain from executing extreme, hasty or untested policies. Competition alone cannot solve the 
problems. Neither can state intervention. The best results may be achieved by a portfolio of 
policies combining political, economic, legal and social means. 
Given the public good nature of global security and the resulting externality effects, policy 
responses to insecurity rely heavily on international coordination efforts, which may be 
fragile if the public good is of the weakest-link type. Given the diversity of the actors 
involved and the difficulty in monitoring and enforcing cooperative behaviour, policy 
coordination at the international level is desirable but hard to achieve. Multilateral institutions 
should play a vital role in this coordination game. 
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